Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner: Expression of First Amendment Rights in the Privately Owned Shopping Center – A Reevaluation by Burger Court by Boccarosse, Ralph N.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 22 
Issue 4 Summer 1973 Article 5 
1973 
Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner: Expression of First Amendment 
Rights in the Privately Owned Shopping Center – A Reevaluation 
by Burger Court 
Ralph N. Boccarosse 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Ralph N. Boccarosse, Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner: Expression of First Amendment Rights in the Privately 
Owned Shopping Center – A Reevaluation by Burger Court, 22 Cath. U. L. Rev. 807 (1973). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol22/iss4/5 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner: Expression of First
Amendment Rights in the Privately Owned Shopping
Center-A Reevaluation by the Burger Court
In Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner,' the United States Supreme Court held that
the owners of a shopping center, open to the general public, could prohibit
the peaceful distribution of handbills whose subject was unrelated to the op-
erations of the shopping center. The Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Jus-
tice Powell, 2 vacated an injunction granted by the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon 3 and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals 4 forbidding interference with the distribution of non-commercial
handbills within a shopping mall. Realizing that various courts had differed
on the question of whether the private property rights of a landowner should
override the protection afforded an individual's first amendment rights, the
Court attempted to clarify the scope of its decisions in Marsh v. Alabama5
and Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc.6 In so doing, the Court refused to continue the trend of gradually ex-
tending protection afforded elements of free speech in areas not traditionally
considered public.7
1. 406 U.S. 551 (1972).
2. Justice Marshall, dissenting, was joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and
Stewart.
3. 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970).
4. 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971).
5. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
6. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
7. The concept that speech is protected in streets and parks, and on sidewalks and
other public areas developed from an early line of cases dealing with municipal ordi-
nances prohibiting the distribution of handbills. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938), Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), and Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.
413 (1943). Since that time areas where speech is protected have been extended to
include: shopping centers (Logan Valley, supra note 6); bus terminals (Wolin v.
Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2nd Cir. 1968)); railway stations (In re
Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967) ), and welfare of-
fices (Massachusetts Welfare Rights Organization v. Ott, 421 F.2d 525 (1st Cir.
1969) ).
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Petitioner was the owner of a large retail shopping center built in 1960 in
Portland, Oregon, which occupied approximately 50 acres, and which had
both open and covered parking facilities for over 1,000 cars. The area was
bounded by four public streets, had a perimeter of almost one and one half
miles, and was crossed by several public streets with adjacent public side-
walks. The central portion of the shopping center complex consisted of a
single multi-level structure with numerous malls and walkways running from
it to the interior parking areas and to the exterior public sidewalks and
streets. Within these fifty foot wide malls, which were open to the general
public at all times, were located about sixty commercial shops and depart-
ment stores which the tenants leased from the Lloyd Corp., as well as an au-
ditorim, which was rented to groups for public meetings, and a skating rink.
The malls, like the walkways, were
. . . interspersed with gardens, flowerbeds, statuary, murals, vari-
ous other works of art, benches, elevators and escalators, stairways,
and bridges and directories and information booths.8
The entire facility was designed to promote retail business by encouraging
customers to enter and shop in an atmosphere isolated from the noise, fumes,
confusion and distraction normally found along city streets.9 In an effort to
attract shoppers, the malls were not physically closed and window shopping
was encouraged within reasonable hours. Yet, although open to the public,
Lloyd had placed signs in various places stating that permission to use the
public areas of the facility could be revoked at any time.'0 It was this al-
leged power to control the public areas of the center which was challenged
by Tanner in this suit.
Lloyd, in accordance with the wishes of its tenants, had enforced a policy
forbidding the distribution of handbills within the building complex and its
8. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 406 U.S. 551 (1972).
9. 406 U.S. at 554. It should be noted that not only did petitioner incur the
burden of a very substantial initial investment in the facilities but along with his ten-
ants spent approximately $350,000 each year to maintain the privately owned common
areas of the center. Supra note 8.
10. The signs carried the following message:
"NOTICE-Areas in Lloyd Center Used By the Public Are Not Public Ways
But Are For The Use of Lloyd Center Tenants And The Public Transacting
Business With Them. Permission To Use Said Areas May Be Revoked At
Any Time. Lloyd Corporation, Ltd.
Supra note 3, at 129.
In the district court opinion there was some question as to the location of the
signs.
Plaintiffs' counsel went to the Center and was unable to find these signs.
Mr. Horn, the manager of the Center, testified that he ordered the signs
installed several years ago and that he assumed they were still there although
he did not know exactly where they were.
308 F. Supp. at 129 n.4.
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malls," because it had found them to be ". . . controversial, distracting and
detrimental to business, and because of the littering that would be caused by
discarded handbills."'1 2  However, Lloyd had permitted a variety of non-
commercial activities by outside organizations in these same areas, when it
felt that the activities would be beneficial to the center's business.' 3 Al-
though both civic and charitable groups had been granted and denied per-
mission to use the center in the past,' 4 it was respondents' position that the
sole criteria used by Lloyd was not the benefit derived by the center but
whether Lloyed approved of the purposes and activities of the particular or-
ganization.' 5
Respondents' situation arose on November 14, 1968, when five individuals
distributed within the walkways of the main part of the center known as the
"Mall" handbill invitations to attend a meeting' 8 sponsored by an informal
group known as the "Resistance Community". While the distribution was
taking place at least one shopper expressed annoyance to the manager of
Lloyd Center. As a result security guards,' 7 employed by the Center, in-
11. Supra note 8, at 5. Those individuals seeking to distribute handbills at the
Center were requested to do so on the publicly-owned streets and sidewalks. However,
after the decision in Logan Valley, Lloyd revised its policy to permit handbilling in
the privately-owned areas if related to its business or that of its tenants.
12. Supra note 8, at 45. The shopping center's argument that the distribution of
handbills would cause a problem with litter would seem to be clearly insufficient
justification for their prohibition. In Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 276
(1951) Justice Frankfurter, dealing with the problem of balancing the right of free
speech in public places with the need to protect the public peace and the primary uses
of streets and parks, said:
[tihe easiest cases have been those in which the only interest opposing free
communication was that of keeping the streets of the community clean. This
could scarcely justify prohibiting the dissemination of information by hand-
bills . ..
The Court in Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 92 (2d Cir. 1968)
came to the same conclusion. ". . . [Nion-commercial leaflet distribution is an essen-
tial right that cannot be barred except for an especially good reason, and the burden
of street cleaning is not good enough."
13. In this regard, the Lloyd Corp. had deemed beneficial the following activities:
football rallies, Veterans Day ceremonies, campaign speeches by presidential candi-
dates, Boy Scout displays, antique automobile displays, and choral and other musical
performances. Brief for Respondent at 5, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 406 U.S. 551 (1972).
14. Lloyd Corp. had permitted the sale of "Buddy Poppies" by the American Legion,
solicitation of funds by the Salvation Army and Volunteers of America, and the dis-
tribution of literature on Portland tourist attractions on the interior malls and walk-
ways of the center. It had denied permission to use the facilities to the March of
Dimes and Hadassah, a national Zionist women's service organization. Supra note 3,
at 129.
15. This contention seems a bit strained when one attempts to draw meaningful
distinctions between charitable organizations such as the Salvation Army and the
March of Dimes.
16. The meeting to protest both the war in Vietnam and the Selective Service sys-
tem was to be held at a church located near the shopping center that same evening.
Supra note 3, at 130.
17. The twelve security officers employed by the Lloyd Center were commissioned
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formed respondents that they were trespassing and would be arrested unless
they stopped their activities. The officers suggested that, if respondents
wished to continue the handbilling, they move to the public streets and side-
walks adjacent to, but outside of the center complex. The individuals
eventually moved outside to continue their distribution and subsequently
instituted a suit in the district court against Lloyd seeking a declaratory judg-
ment and an injunction forbidding further denial of permission to distribute
non-commercial handbills in the privately-owned areas of Lloyd Center.
The district court found that the Lloyd Corp. invited everyone to the Cen-
ter and that the Mall was open to the general public.' 8 The court also noted
that there was no littering or disturbance and that the handbills were distrib-
uted to only those who were willing to take them.19 In rejecting Lloyd's
claim that the Center was more like an office building than like a public
business district, Chief Judge Solomon stated: "Its parking facilities and
sidewalks serve the same purpose as streets and sidewalks of a public busi-
ness district. I find that the Mall is the functional equivalent of a public
business district."'20 Finding that Donald Tanner, Betsy Wheeler, and Susan
Roberts were merely expressing their political beliefs, the court likened the
situation to the expression of religious beliefs in Marsh v. Alabama.
Plaintiffs' distribution of handbills here was identical to the dis-
tribution of literature in Marsh. Here also, the owner claims the
right to bar the distribution of literature or to select which litera-
ture may be distributed. The sole distinction between this case
and Marsh is that this case involves a shopping center whereas
Marsh involved a town. I do not believe that distinction should
cause a different result.2 '
Not wishing to end its opinion at this point, the court went on to say that
Logan Valley had expressly extended Marsh to shopping centers.22 Admitting
that Logan Valley had left open the question of whether an owner could bar
picketing that was not directly related to the use of the center the court said
that "[h]ere, [p]laintiffs' distribution of handbills was pure speech." 23
by the City of Portland as special police officers, wore uniforms similar to those
worn by the city police and were licensed to carry handguns. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 130-31.
20. Id. at 130. The court in rejecting the analogy to an office building noted that
the 1954 Portland ordinance vacating about eight acres of public streets for use by the
corporation stated that the City intended the land be used for the construction of a
general retail business district.
21. Id. at 132.
22. Id.
23. Id. The statement by the court that handbilling constituted pure speech is
erroneous. As the Supreme Court stated in Logan Valley supra note 6, at 315-16:
"[h]andbilling, like picketing, involves conduct other than speech, namely, the physical
presence of the person. .. "
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Chief Judge Solomon, again relying on his analysis of Marsh and Logan Val-
ley, concluded that
• . .[An owner who opens his land to the general public for busi-
ness purposes, to the extent that the land becomes the functional
equivalent of a public business district, gives up the right to pro-
hibit the distribution of literature or to decide which literature
may be distributed. If this were not true, the public need for in-
formation, on which Marsh was based, could be frustrated. 24
The decision of the district court was affirmed by the court of appeals in a
brief per curiam opinion which stated that they were bound by the factual de-
termination that the facility was the functional equivalent of a public business
district.2 5 Although stating that the factual determination was not "clearly
erroneous" the court of appeals said:
Our opinion is not, of course, an extension of the holdings of the
Supreme Court in [Logan Valley] and Marsh. The extent to
which the appellant's facility had been opened to public use is re-
flected in the district court's factual determinations.2 6
By seemingly hedging on the lower court's conclusion, the court of appeals
evidenced the problem that many other jurisdictions were having when
faced with the ramifications of the Marsh - Logan Valley rationale, and it
was this problem which the Supreme Court faced on appeal. In attempting
to clarify the issues the Court re-emphasized the significance of Marsh-the
foundation on which the later decisions rested.
Physical Characteristics Test-the Marsh Rationale
A company town located in a suburb of Mobile, Alabama known as Chicka-
saw was the locus of the issues raised in Marsh v. Alabama. Owned by the
Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, a private company, it had, in the words of
Justice Black, ". . . all the characteristics of any other American town."' 27
The private property consisted of residential buildings, streets, a "business
block" with stores, a post office, a sewer system and a sewage disposal sys-
tem. 28  The area was freely accessible to individuals who desired to use the
facilities and was indistinguishable from the property not owned by the com-
pany. Grace Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, came onto the sidewalk 29 near
the post office and began to distribute religious literature. She was warned
24. Supra note 3, at 132.
25. 446 F.2d at 546.
26. Id. n.1.
27. 326 U.S. at 502.
28. Id. The business establishments were leased by the company to various indi-
viduals.
29. The sidewalk, located along the store fronts, was used "in order to enter and
leave the stores and the post office." Id. at 503.
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that she could not distribute the literature without a permit, that she would
not be issued a permit, and that if she continued her activity she would be ar-
rested.30 When Marsh refused to desist she was arrested for criminal tres-
pass 31 and later convicted. The Supreme Court in overturning the convic-
tion, reasoned that
[h]ad the title to Chickasaw belonged not to a private but to a
municipal corporation and had appellant been arrested for violat-
ing a municipal ordinance rather than a ruling by those appointed
by the corporation to manage [the] company town it would have
been clear that [the] conviction must be reversed.32
Therefore, it was necessary for the Court to circumvent the issue of private
ownership.
Relying on Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,33 Justice Black attacked the
issue directly.
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.34
Disregarding the issue of whether or not the sidewalk had been "dedicated"
to public use, Black instead turned to the policy interest of having channels of
communication freely available to the public. He noted that in balancing
the Constitutional rights of owners of property against the peoples' right to
enjoy freedom of speech and religion ". . . we remain mindful of the fact
that the latter occupy a preferred position."'35  Since "[t]he 'business block'
serve[d] as the community shopping center and [was] freely accessible
and open to the people in the area and those passing through,"'3 6 Black con-
cluded that the fact of private rather than public ownership was not enough
to justify the restriction on Marsh and reversed her conviction. The dis-
sent,37 written by Justice Reed, criticized the extension of first amendment
rights into private places without the consent of the owner. He stated that he
30. The corporation had posted the following notice in some of the stores: "This is
Private Property, and Without Written Permission, No Street, or House Vendor, Agent
or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be Permitted." Id.
31. She was charged with violation of Title 14 § 426 of the Code of Alabama
(1940) which makes it criminal to enter or remain on the premises of another after
having been warned not to do so. Id. at 503-04.
32. Id.
33. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
34. 326 U.S. 501, 506.
35. Id. at 509. Justice Black referred to three other decisions where freedom of
the press and religion had been termed in a preferred position. Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943);
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944).
36. 326 U.S. at 508.
37. Chief Justice Stone and Justice Burton joined Justice Reed in his dissent. Jus-
tice Frankfurter wrote a separate concurring opinion while Justice Jackson took no part
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hoped the decision would be limited to the precise facts of the case, as he saw
them,- "... that is to private property in a company town where the owner
for his own advantage has permitted a restricted public use by his licensees
and invitees. ' '38
The decision in Marsh left many unanswered questions, the most impor-
tant one being the extent to which private property needed to be open to pub-
lic use before an individual could exercise constitutional rights free from
the fear of reprisal. Access to private property seemingly depended on
whether the property had acquired sufficient "public character" to equate it
to the "business block" in Marsh. Yet, Justice Black had stressed not merely
the physical characteristics of the company town but also the need to balance
the competing interests of owner and citizen. It was in the interim between
Marsh and the decision in Logan Valley that the balancing test was first used
and then discarded in favor of the physical characteristics test.
The Shopping Center Dilemma-Selecting the Appropriate Test
The growing economy and the mobility of the people caused a change in the
traditional idea of the town business center. No longer were the courts able
to look only at small individually owned stores and shops to determine
whether through their use or physical appearance they had taken on a quasi-
public character. They were now faced with conflicts within larger shopping
centers and their decision depended upon their conception of the appropriate
test to be used.39 The problem was most apparent in the area of labor rela-
tions where union members would picket stores or plants on leased property.
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Babcook & Wilcox Co.40 held that a com-
pany could exclude union organizers who were non-employees from the com-
pany-owned parking lots when there were reasonable alternative means of
reaching the employees elsewhere. Although finding that the only public
place in the vicinity of the plant where leaflets could effectively be distributed
was unsafe because of traffic conditions, the Court refused to consider the
private parking lot as quasi-public. 41 In State of Maryland v. Williams42 the
in the decision of the case. Of the four Justices who joined in the majority opinion,
only Justices Black and Douglas were still on the bench when Marsh was extended by
Logan Valley.
38. Two articles acknowledged the potential for future confusion in this area:
Note, 34 GEO. L.J. 244 (1946) and Note, 1947 WIs. L. REV. 121 (1947).
39. See Comment, Free Speech: Peaceful Picketing on Quasi-Public Property, 53
MINN. L. REV. 873 (1969).
40. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
41. Id. at 107. The Court found that all 500 of the plant's employees lived within
a thirty mile radius of the plant and that the union had in the past made contact
through the mails, on the streets of the local community about a mile away, and by
telephone.
42. 44 L.R.R.M. 2357 (1959).
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owner of a shopping center with about fifty tenants brought suit to enjoin the
picketing of a drugstore within the center. In noting that when an owner
leased part of his property he necessarily lost some of his control over it, the
NLRB found that "because the private property involved here has been open
to the public, it has taken on the nature of a quasi-public place. ' '43 Using
Marsh as the basis for its opinion, the Board declared that the property was
not private anymore and that the competing interest of freedom of speech
must be served.44
Another labor dispute forced the Illinois courts to deal with the problem of
picketing on private property in People v. Goduto.4 5 The defendants were
union representatives of Local 1550, of the Retail Clerks International Asso-
ciation and had been arrested for distributing leaflets in a parking lot adja-
cent to a Sears Roebuck store. Relying on Marsh and the rationale of Bab-
cock the defendants argued that there were no other reasonable means of
communicating with the employees and that they were merely exercising
their right of free speech. However, the court refused to accept this argu-
ment and was also not willing to accept the NLRB expansion of Marsh. In
adopting a strict reading of Marsh the court stated, "[w]e believe that
[Marsh] goes no further than to say that the public has the same rights of
discussion on the sidewalks of company towns that it has on the sidewalks of
municipalities. ' 46 The court, in using the balancing test found that the prop-
erty owners' rights outweighed the rights of the protestors. In a series of
cases which followed, various state courts rejected the balancing test entirely
and instead turned to the ideas espoused in Williams. They began to pay
strict attention to the physical characteristics and the use of the facilities and
found that it was quite reasonable to impose more stringent rules on shop-
ping centers serving a community business area than on private property
which was closely held and controlled by the owner.
The owner of a four acre shopping center brought suit to enjoin union pic-
keting on the sidewalk in front of one of the leased stores in Moreland Corp.
v. Retail Store Employees Local 444.47 In rejecting the plaintiff-owner's con-
43. Id. at 2360.
44. The Board also relied upon People v. Barisi, 193 Misc. 934, 86 N.Y.S.2d 277
(1948) which held that Marsh v. Alabama gave free speech protection to union
picketing inside Penn Station in New York. In that case the station owners suit
against the pickets was dismissed because it was determined that the owners had made
the facility quasi-public by opening it up to the general public and by leasing parts of
the facility to others.
45. 21 Il1. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
46. Id. at 611, 174 N.E.2d at 390. In another Illinois case involving union leaf-
leting on private property the court came to a different conclusion when it found that
the employer had "virtually dedicated the parking area for public use." People v.
Mazo, 38 CCH Lab. Cas. 65, 835, at 68,007 (1962).
47. 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962).
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tention that the sidewalk was private and was provided solely for the con-
venience of those persons who it allowed to enter the stores, the court stated
that physical characteristics of the shopping center governed the degree to
which it was open to the public.
If the record before us clearly established that the property in-
volved [was] a multi-store shopping center, with sidewalks simu-
lated so as to appear public in nature, we would have no difficulty
in reaching a conclusion that the property rights of the shopping
center owner must yield to the rights of freedom of speech .... 48
The court sent the case back to the trial court for a determination of the phys-
ical characteristics. The Michigan court followed the same line of reasoning
in upholding the right of union members to distribute handbills in a shopping
center. 49 After emphasizing that the center occupied 55 acres, had parking
spaces for 5,500 cars, and had on occasion been visited by over 60,000 peo-
ple in one day the court concluded that although privately owned, the center
was quasi-public in nature. Applying the physical characteristic and use test
the court stated:
The change from the operation of a single store by a storekeeper
to a large, complex multiple shopping center, alters the very nature
of the operation from one of a purely private character to one of
public or quasi-public character . . . [and the owners] no longer
can claim the same rights to their property.50
The court went on to say that the only difference between the public markets
of earlier days and the shopping centers of today was that the same operation
had simply been modernized."
The Tennessee Supreme Court denied pickets access to a parking area ad-
jacent to a retail store on private property in Hood v. Stafford.5 2 The parti-
cipants in the picketing were former employees who had not been rehired
when ownership of the store changed hands. Stressing the fact that this was
a single store on private property and not a part of a large shopping center,
the court refused to accept the defendant's contention that the parking lot
was a quasi-public place. Instead, they said that only customers and those
48. Id. at 505, 114 N.W.2d at 879.
49. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center Inc., 370 Mich.
547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963).
50. Id. at 564-65, 122 N.W.2d at 794.
51. Id. at 567, 122 N.W.2d at 796. The Court also noted the possibility of creat-
ing community centers ten times larger than the instant center thereby denying consti-
tutional rights to many individuals on the ground that it was private property.
52. 213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964). The defendants claimed that since the
nearest public sidewalk was about 200 to 300 feet away they had a right to picket on
the private property. The court relying on NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, supra note 40,
rejected this contention saying in effect that alternative means of communication
were available.
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having business transactions at the store were either expressly or impliedly in-
vited on the premises. Thus, this court also came to the conclusion that
characteristics of size and area reflected the apparent intent of the owner to
open up his property to use by others. Rather than attempting to balance
the competing interests the court simply indicated that the store in this case
did not possess the physical requirements necessitating treatment as a quasi-
public facility.
Only in Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers Local 3153
was the balancing test revived. The plaintiff operated a shopping center
which consisted of a parking lot, driveways, sidewalks, and several stores
which were leased to tenants.54 The defendant union had been unsuccessful
in organizing the workers at one of the stores and had picketed on the side-
walk in front of it. The plaintiff, as operator of the center, brought an action
to enjoin the union from trespassing on his property. Suggesting that picket-
ing at some other location would be less effective and that it could entail
"... the danger of traffic tie-ups, confusion as to the object of the picketing
and the requirements of larger signs and more pickets," 55 the court found the
interests of the union superior to those of the complainant. Applying the
balancing test, the court decided that "[b]ecause of the public character of
the shopping center, the impairment of plaintiffs' interest must be largely
theoretical." ' The decision in Schwartz indicated that the state courts
needed guidance in dealing with the constitutional problems created by labor
conflicts in shopping centers. The Supreme Court sought to provide this
guidance in Logan Valley.
Logan Valley and its Ramifications
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. was the owner of a large shopping center complex
known as Logan Valley Mall located near Altoona, Pennsylvania. Situated
near the intersection of two main highways, it was accessible only from five
entrance roads leading directly to the center and was separated from the
main highways by earthen berms 12 to 15 feet wide. The perimeter of the
area was one mile and expansive parking areas were provided near the build-
ings located around the mall area.5 7 In December, 1965, Weis Markets Inc.,
53. 40 Cal. Rptr. 233, 394 P.2d 921 (1964).
54. Id. at 234, 394 P.2d at 922. The plaintiff leased the six acre parcel
of land on which the shopping center was built from the City of Torrance and sub-
leased the individual stores to others.
55. Id. at 236, 394 P.2d at 924.
56. Id. For an analysis of the entire area of peaceful picketing in shopping
centers, see generally Comment, Shopping Centers and Labor Relations Law, 10
STAN. L. REv. 694 (1958).
57. 391 U.S. at 311.
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one of the two tenants5 that occupied the newly built center was picketed by
the food employees union. The peaceful picketing was carried out almost
entirely in a parcel pick-up area directly in front of the store and in the park-
ing lot immediately adjacent to it.59 After allowing the picketing to continue
for ten days, Weis and Logan brought suit to enjoin the picketing. The court
immediately issued an ex parte order which had the effect of barring any
further picketing on the center's property. 60 As a result, the union members
continued their picketing and distributed handbills along the berms beside
the public roads outside the center while contesting the validity of the order.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the in-
junction stating that the Union was guilty of a trespass on Logan's property.
The Supreme Court began with the premise that peaceful picketing on
public property was protected by the first amendment 6 and then posed the
question of whether this right was also protected on privately owned prop-
erty. Referring to Marsh, Justice Marshall noted ". . . that under some cir-
cumstances property that is privately owned may, at least for First Amend-
ment purposes be treated as though it were publicly held."'6 2  Looking at the
physical characteristics of the center it was noted that the mall was adjacent
to a heavily travelled highway, that there were sidewalks from the parking
areas to the buildings and that parking areas and roadways for vehicles were
provided. The Court concluded that
58. Id. The other store at the time was operated by Sears & Roebuck. At the
time of the Supreme Court decision there were fifteen commercial tenants located in
the center.
59. The parcel pickup area, located directly in front of the store had an abutting
porch about 30 to 40 feet in length and four to five feet in width and was marked off
with yellow lines. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. v. Amalgamated Food Employees Local
590, 425 Pa. 382, 384, 227 A.2d 874, 875 (1967).
60. The injunction restrained the union from (I) picketing and trespassing on the
store proper, the porch and the parcel pickup area; (2) picketing and trespassing upon
the parking areas and the entrances and exits belonging to Logan; (3) physically
interfering with individuals attempting to enter or leave the Weis store; (4) violence
towards Weis' business invitees; (5) interference with Weis' employees in the per-
formance of their duties. Id. at 385, 227 A.2d at 876.
61. As to protection afforded picketing under the first amendment, see Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Bakery Drivers
Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942). However, the Court made it clear that
since picketing was not pure speech some controls were constitutionally permissible.
See generally Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Building Service Local
262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1964). Picketing has been subjected to a blanket
prohibition in some instances when it was found to be directed at an illegal end or
directed towards coercing an employer into a decision. See Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Building Service Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339
U.S. 532 (1950); Plumbers Local 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953); Carpenters
Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke,
339 U.S. 470 (1950); Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287 (1941).
62. 391 U.S. at 316.
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The general public has unrestricted access to the mall property.
The shopping center here is clearly the functional equivalent to the
business district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh.3
However, after finding that the shopping center was equivalent to the busi-
ness district in Marsh the court attempted to limit the scope of its conclusion:
All we decide here is that because the shopping center serves as
the community business block . . . the State may not delegate the
power, through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those
members of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment
rights on the premises in a manner and for a purpose generally
consonant with the use to which the property is actually put.6 4
This limitation is especially important when one reads footnote nine of the
opinion which was one of the major points which the majority in Tanner re-
lied upon.
The picketing carried on by petitioners was directed specifically
at patrons of the Weis Market located within the shopping center
and the message sought to be conveyed to the public concerned the
manner in which that particular market was being operated. We
are, therefore, not called upon to consider whether respondents'
property rights could, consistently with the First Amendment, jus-
tify a bar on picketing which was not thus directly related in its
purpose to the use to which the shopping center property was
being put.6 5
Holding that both the state and the shopping center were able to make
reasonable regulations66 concerning the exercise of first amendment rights on
63. Id. at 318. The Court found that the roadways provided for vehicular movement
and the sidewalks between the buildings were the functional equivalents of a normal
municipal district. In tracing the Court's conclusion Morris Forkosch noted:
The path of reasoning that is pursued is substantially as follows: publicly
owned business district streets and sidewalks are open to and belong to the
general public; privately owned business district streets and sidewalks are
open to all and are used by the general public; privately owned driveways
and sidewalks within an enclosed shopping center are used by a significant
portion of the general public. Thus, . . . 'the general public has unrestricted
access to the mall property. The shopping center here is clearly the func-
tional equivalent of the business district. .. '
Forkosch, Picketing in Shopping Centers, 26 WASH. & LEE L. lv. 250, 255-56 (1969).
64. 391 U.S. at 319-20 (emphasis added).
65. 391 U.S. at 320 n.9 (emphasis added). This type of statement has been seen
many times in the opinions of the Supreme Court and is evidence of their traditional
reluctance to adjudicate an issue which has not been raised. At least four authors
have felt that footnote nine might pose an important limitation on the impact of Logan
Valley, see Note, Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc.: The Right to Picket on a Privately Owned Shopping Center, 73 DicK. L. REV.
519 (1968-69); Note, Picketing of the Modern Marketplace: The Rights of Ownership
and Free Speech, 48 B.U.L. REV. 699 (1968); Note, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 101 (1968-
69); and 53 MINN. L. REV. 873, supra note 39.
66. Regulation of the exercise of first amendment rights has been upheld when the
exercise unduly interferes with the normal use of the property by other individuals,
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the private property, the Court found that the absolute prohibition7 of pic-
keting and trespassing allowed by the Pennsylvania courts could not be sus-
tained since the picketing was directly related to the shopping center's use.
The majority also noted that the practical effect of barring the pickets from
the center's property was to force the pickets to carry on their activities 350 to
500 feet away where it would be more hazardous and less effective. The
majority cited statistics showing the growth, in numbers, of shopping centers
and feared the possibility of businesses in the suburbs being able to immunize
themselves from criticism which their downtown counterparts would be sub-
ject to. In their opinion, the businessman who opens his property to the pub-
lic for his personal benefit should not be able to create a "cordon sanitare"
around his store simply by the construction of parking lots.68
In dissenting, Justice Black was extremely critical of the majority's exten-
sion of Marsh to the area of private property: "... I believe that whether
this Court likes it or not the Constitution recognizes and supports the concept
of private ownership of property." 9 He felt that the critical factor in Marsh
was that the property had encompassed an area which for all practical pur-
poses had been turned into a town. As the author of the Marsh opinion his
conclusion that ". . . Marsh was never intended to apply to this kind of situ-
ation" is especially persuasive. Black concluded that the majority had mis-
read Marsh and that the only time private property could be treated as pub-
lic ". . . [was] when the property [had] taken on all the attributes of a
town. .... -70 Justice White, in his dissent, agreed that the issue should be
see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395 (1953); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
67. The Supreme Court has upheld complete prohibition on interference with cer-
tain forms of speech, see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Chaplinsky v. State
of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952);
Roth v. United Sthtes, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
68. 391 U.S. at 325. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, noted that although
the Logan Valley Mall was not dedicated to public use to the degree of the company
town in Marsh, the picketers could not be banished to the public berms so as to create
a sanctuary from unfavorable criticism. Id. at 326. One author agreed with Douglas!
opinion, "The shopping center in [Logan Valley] probably did not serve the public in
the same manner as the company owned town in Marsh because the community was
not so wholly dependent upon the shopping center as their only 'public square'."
1 U. TOLEDO L. RaV. 259 (1969).
69. 391 U.S. at 330.
70. Id. at 332 (emphasis in original). Black noted that in Marsh the town had
streets, sewers, residential buildings and a business district. He stated that there was
no indication in that opinion that the mere presence of one of these attributes was
enough to give a public character to private property. Black was also critical of the
majority's assumption that the general public had been invited to the shopping center;
"... the whole public was no more wanted there then they would be invited to park
free at a pay parking lot." Id. Black's apparent distinction between the public in
general and customers had found support in at least one court in a situation involving
union picketing of a supermarket. Relying on the lower court opinion in Logan
Valley the Ohio court said:
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whether all the attributes of a town were present and not that some stores
were organized into a "business district". He was fearful of an extension of
this rule to other business establishments which were not shopping centers
but which had sidewalks and parking areas on their property. Thus, Justices
Black and White were willing to follow the physical characteristics test that
the majority had accepted, but they did not want it applied narrowly. In
their opinion the determination as to whether a shopping center displayed
enough characteristics to be deemed open to the general public should de-
pend not on its similarity to the business district alone but to the business
district and all those other attributes that a town possesses.
The Logan Valley decision formalized the test that the majority of state
courts had already been using,71 but some questions remained unanswered.
The plaintiffs have granted certain rights to the public but only to that seg-
ment who would be potential customers and possibly would contribute to the
financial success of the enterprise. The grant or invitation was not to the
general public to utilize the area for whatever purpose it deemed advisable.
South Discount Foods, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 1552, 14 Ohio Misc. 188, 235 N.E.2d
143, 147 (C.P. Ohio 1968) (emphasis added).
In a situation unrelated to shopping centers but which used a similar line of reason-
ing, see Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968) where Judge Friendly upheld the
suspension from school of four students who had protested on school property during
a ROTC ceremony saying: "Alfred's football field does not fit the rubric of either
Marsh or Logan Valley Plaza; it was open only to persons connected with the Uni-
versity or licensed by it to participate in or attend athletic contests or other events."
Id. at 80. In Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 1321, 1330 (8th Cir. 1971),
Judge Gibson argued that parking lots which were provided solely for employees and
potential customers were not of such a public character that the owner waived his right
of control over them. "In no sense of the word are these private parking lots . . .
public streets, public squares, public parks or their equivalents." See also Chumley v.
Santa Anita Consolidated, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 452, 93 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Ct. App. 1971)
(race track owner extended invitation to only those individuals who desired to pay the
price of admission).
71. Two commentators felt that the Court did not have to reach the question of
whether the area was functionally equivalent to the business block in Marsh. In their
opinion the Court effectively adopted the five prong test that Judge Hill had enun-
ciated in his concurring opinion in Freeman v. Retail Clerks Local 1207, 58 Wash. 2d
426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961). Hill had noted five separate factors which if present
should result in having the court weigh the equities of the parties:
(1) When the private property owner designs his property for use by the
general public in such a manner as to make it difficult or impossible to dis-
tinguish its physical characteristics from publicly-owned property similarly so
devoted; (2) The exercise of the right of free speech is for the purpose of
making a communication to persons naturally upon the premises as a result of
the inherent nature of the primary use to which the property is devoted;
(3) A similar communication clearly would be permitted under identical
circumstances had the property been public; (4) Interference with the owner's
fundamental rights of privacy or personal use and occupancy is not involved
as distinguished from control, and no direct pecuniary loss will result to the
owner; (5) The trespasser had no place or means available as an alternate, or
the only alternate would be unrealistic or impractical to the point where
there exists a serious restriction upon the trespasser's ability to communicate
as effectively as would naturally and normally be expected were the legal
title in public ownership.
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One of the major problems was the extent to which private property would
be open to other free speech activities which were not directly related to the
use of the property. The Court did not define the term "generally conso-
nant" or attempt to establish guidelines as to what would constitute "reason-
able regulations" governing conduct in the centers. Instead, it left the courts
to apply Logan Valley on a case by case basis, but the application was by no
means uniform and caused as many problems as before. 72
Just a few weeks after the Logan Valley decision was announced, the
Minnesota Supreme Court dealt with the issue of first amendment activities
which were not generally consonant with the use to which the property was
being put.73 Citing Logan Valley as controlling, the court found that indi-
viduals who had entered a shopping center for the purpose of distributing
campaign literature in support of a candidate for state office were not guilty
of trespassing on private property. Finding that the shopping center had
many business concerns located within it and that it was generally open to
the public the court indicated that the reasoning of Logan Valley necessitated
that the individuals be allowed to carry on their activities. Although it is ar-
guable that this initial application of the Logan Valley rule may have been
overly broad, it exemplifies one of the problems that existed.
In the area of labor disputes the issue frequently litigated concerned not
the relationship of the activity to the use of the property, but the factual de-
termination indicating that the facility or area was quasi-public. In Taggart
v. Weinacker's Inc.,74 the Alabama Supreme Court refused to apply Logan
Valley to a small privately owned general department store which was being
picketed by a Union. The picketing occurred on a private sidewalk four to
five feet wide directly in front of the store which was set back from the public
street. The court cited three factors which distinguished it from Logan Val-
ley: (1) the trespass was only narrowly enjoined (they could continue to
picket on the public street); (2) the trespass was on the property of a single
store owner; (3) the trespass obstructed the customers entering the store. 75
Had the Court presented this test affirmatively some of the later problems of inter-
pretation might have been avoided. See 73 DICK. L. REv. 519, 526 (1968) and 35
BROOKLYN L. REV. 101, 106 (1968).
72. As to conflicting interpretations of the scope of Logan Valley, see 1 U.
TOLEDO L. REV. 259, 263 (1969); 48 ORE. L. REV. 426, 428 (1968-69); and 20 SYR.
L. REV. 82, 85 (1968).
73. State v. Miller, 280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d 895 (1968).
74. 283 Ala. 171, 214 So. 2d 913 (1968); petition for cert. dismissed, 397 U.S. 223
(1969).
75. Id. at 178, 214 So. 2d at 920. The court also weighed the interests of the two
parties and found only a slight inconvenience to the Union in having to move to the
public street. But see In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729, 457 P.2d 561
(1969), where a labor union officer was allowed to distribute handbills on a private
sidewalk directly in front of a grocery store which was not a part of a shopping center.
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They concluded that the sidewalk had not become quasi-public and that the
Union should be enjoined from the property. The seventh circuit dealt with
the same issue in a case involving a privately owned Chicago industrial park
containing buildings which were leased to different companies. Known as
the "District," the area had its own streets, sidewalks and signs but there
were no thru-streets and only one entrance from the public street.76 The
NLRB had found that the District was a quasi-public place and allowed the
distribution of union literature on the property. The court of appeals re-
versed, stating that the District was neither the functional equivalent of the
business district in Marsh nor the shopping center in Logan Valley.
The problem of determining whether a privately-owned facility or area
was quasi-public was not limited to cases involving labor disputes. In Chum-
ley v. Santa Anita Consolidated, Inc.,77 a California court held that an area
which was used for pedestrian flow and parking outside of an enclosure which
barred the public from a race track facility was private property. It found
that the premises neither served as the business district of the surrounding
community nor as the "traditional town square." In other situations various
courts refused to extend Logan Valley to areas which were used by relatively
few people. Students at Atlanta University claimed that they were not guilty
of a trespass on a vacant lot owned by the school on which they had con-
ducted a four month vigil in honor of Martin Luther King. They asserted
that the property was open to public use because neighborhood children had
not been barred from playing there, persons used it as a short cut, and be-
cause the University was tax-exempt. 78 Menominee Indians unsuccessfully
attempted to demonstrate peacefully in the parking lot of a sales office of a
corporation in which they held stock. Using the shopping center concept,
the court noted that ". . . a parking lot is not in the same category as a shop-
ping center, the public does not have an unrestricted right to enter a pri-
vately-owned parking lot. .... 70
Although the handbilling involved a single store the court found that the sidewalk
was open to the public and that the closest public sidewalk was about 150 to 280 feet
away and compared the situation to that in Logan Valley.
76. NLRB v. Solo Cup Co., 422 F.2d 1149, 1150 (7th Cir. 1970). In NLRB v.
Monogram Models, Inc., 420 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1969) it had been alleged unsuccess-
fully that the shoulder area of a public road located directly in front of the main en-
trance of a plant was distinguishable from both public sidewalks and streets.
77. 15 Cal. App. 3d 452, 93 Cal. Rptr. 77, 82 (Ct. App. 1971).
78. Griffin v. Trustees of Atlanta Univ., 225 Ga. 859, 171 S.E.2d 618 (1969).
79. Brooks v. Peters, 322 F. Supp. 1273, 1277 (E.D. Wis. 1971). Offices were the
subject of protest in City of Chicago v. Rosser, 47 Ill. 2d 10, 264 N.E.2d 158 (1970)
where the court held that protestors were guilty of a trespass-". . . [W]e do not
believe that the elevator corridor outside the Archdiocese office on the sixth floor of
the American Dental Association building in Chicago can be considered functionally,
spatially or in any other way equivalent to the town of Chickasaw in Marsh [or]
the shopping center in Logan Valley...." See also Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society,
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A different determination as to the public character of a bus terminal was
reached in Wolin v. Port of New York Authority when a group of individuals
were denied access to a bus terminal in New York City.80 Finding that the
general public was afforded access to the facilities inside the terminal, and
that the design and physical appearance of the facility resembled that of a
street, the court concluded:
The terminal, with its many adjuncts, becomes something of a
small city-but built indoors. . . . Thus, we cannot accept the
argument that the mere presence of a roof alters the character of
the place, or makes the Terminal an inappropriate place for ex-
pression."'
Rejecting defendant's argument that the forum was inappropriate because the
message to be conveyed bore no special relation to the operation of the Ter-
minal, the court noted that in some situations the place represents the object
of protest while in others the place is where the relevant audience may be
found. Disregarding the implication of footnote nine in Logan Valley, the
court set up its own list of factors to be considered:
. . . [T]he inquiry must go further: does the character of the
place, the pattern of usual activity, the nature of its essential pur-
pose and the population who take advantage of the general invita-
tion extended make it an appropriate place for communication of
views on issues of political and social significance.82
The Wolin court was not alone in its misinterpretation of Logan Valley in re-
gard to the relation of the activity to the particular forum. A series of cases
involving shopping centers including the lower court opinion in Tanner also
concluded that the activity need not be directly related.
445 F.2d 1150, 1156 n.8 (2d Cir. 1971), where the court noted that "... the offices
of the Legal Aid Society hardly compare with the street in Marsh or the parking lot
in Logan Valley, since the Society's offices did not constitute an appropriate place for
communication of views on issues of political or social significance. Contra Unem-
ployed Workers Union v. Hackett, 332 F. Supp. 1372 (D.R.I. 1971). (Department of
Employment Security office was a public forum and it was particularly appropriate
for the expression of views concerning the rights of the unemployed). However some
limitations can still be placed on the activities, see LeClair v. O'Neil, 307 F. Supp. 621
(E.D. Mass. 1969).
80. 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968). The indi-
viduals were associated with the Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee and
the Veterans and Reservists to End the War. They intended to distribute literature
and talk to traveling servicemen. Id.
81. Id. at 89.
82. Id. The California Supreme Court had found that Union Railroad Station in
Los Angeles was a valid forum for the distribution of leaflets concerning the Vietnam
War. In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967). Noting
that a railway station was like a public street or park the court asserted that the test
was not whether the protestor's use of the station was a railway use but whether it
interfered with that use. Id.
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In Diamond v. Bland8 3 the California Supreme Court ruled that a group
engaged in securing signatures on two anti-pollution petitions had to be al-
lowed to carry on their campaign within the mall area of the privately owned
Inland Center. Located in San Bernardino, its physical layout was very
similar to that of the Lloyd Center and the policy as to use of the facilities by
outside groups was as strict.8 4 The court found that the rationale of Marsh
plus the analogy drawn between the company town and the shopping center
in Logan Valley was enough to justify an extension of the rule in this situation
Finding that the contemporary shopping center in many ways resembled the
traditional town square the court attempted to weigh the competing interests
of the parties, thus rejuvenating the balancing test which had seemingly died
with Logan Valley. The substantial interest in being able to solicit signatures
and distribute information to the thousands of persons passing through the
center was matched against the owner's interest in having all non-business re-
lated activities prohibited. Feeling that the infringement on the property
owners' rights were theoretical and that reasonable regulations enacted by
the owner would be permissible, the court held that the complete prohibition
was invalid and that the group should be allowed to continue their solicita-
tion. The conclusion of the court was given direct support by a Washington
state court which attempted to distinguish picketing from other first amend-
ment activities.
We do not interpret comments in Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 320
n. 9, as compelling a direct relationship between the retail func-
tions of a shopping center and the exercise of all First Amendment
privileges. There is good reason to limit picketing in a shopping
center to a direct relationship to stores located within a shopping
center. There is no limitation of the broad holding of Marsh or
Logan Valley as they relate to other First Amendment privileges.8 5
83. 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988
(1971). The lower court opinion which was reversed is found at 8 Cal. App. 3d 58,
87 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1970).
84. The center contained a large parking lot and a totally covered complex which
housed 75 tenant stores and which was visited by about 25,000 people daily. The
covered mall had 32 foot wide common aisleways with benches, receptacles, and
piped-in music where displays were sometimes placed. Homart, the developer, had
forbidden all activity on these common aisleways except for the mutually beneficial pro-
motions and displays which were strictly regulated. In this regard, the center had re-
fused all requests regarding solicitation and distribution of handbills from religious,
charitable, fraternal and political groups. Id. at 656, 477 P.2d at 734, 91 Cal. Rptr.
at 502.
85. Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center Inc., 3 Wash. App. 833, 840, 479
P.2d 792, 799 (Ct. App. 1971). This action was brought by the Washington Environ-
mental Council who had attempted to solicit signatures for an initiative dealing with
shoreland protection at two shopping centers--Southcenter and Northgate. Southcenter
had 115 tenants who occupied over 1.5 million square feet and had an anticipated sales
volume of seventy-four million dollars. Northgate had 109 tenants who occupied about
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However, after concluding that the activities were different, this court also
reverted to the use of the balancing test.
[T]he court in Marsh and Logan Valley did not state all First
Amendment rights would, per se, outweigh the interests of the
shopping center owner. [I]t seems to us each case requires an
inquiry into the nature of the rights sought to be asserted and their
importance as weighed against the interest of the shopping center
owner.8
Although the California and Washington courts reached a different result
than did the United States Supreme Court in Tanner, it is apparent that the
correct test was employed in each instance. Therefore, it is necessary to ex-
amine the rationale of Tanner to determine if the test was applied correctly.
Tanner and the future
The strict application of the holding in Logan Valley by the court in Tanner
v. Lloyd was in some respects an affirmance of Justice Black's dissent in that
case. Conceding that Black was correct when he said that "Marsh was
never intended to apply to this kind of situation", the majority nevertheless
concluded that both Marsh and Logan Valley were correctly decided. Stat-
ing that Logan Valley extended Marsh only where the First Amendment ac-
tivity was directly related to the shopping center, the Court asserted that the
decision was in fact only a narrow extension of Marsh and that the rest was
dicta:
There is some language in Logan Valley unnecessary to the de-
cision, suggesting that the key focus of Marsh was upon the "busi-
ness district"... 87
The Court quoted from Justice Black's opinion and then concluded
The holding in Logan Valley was not dependent upon the sug-
gestion that the privately owned streets and sidewalks of a business
district or a shopping center are the equivalent, for First Amend-
ment purposes, of municipally owned streets and sidewalks. No
such expansive reading of the opinion for the Court is necessary
or appropriate.88
1.25 million square feet and had a slightly lower sales anticipation of seventy million
dollars in 1970. Since both facilities were larger than any of the shopping centers
involved in previous lawsuits within the scope of this article, it was an easier case in
which to extend the Logan Valley rationale.
86. Id. at 840, 478 P.2d at 799. In applying the balancing test the court used
the following criteria to make their determination: (1) the preference accorded first
amendment rights; (2) the importance of the initiative process; (3) the quasi-public
nature of the streets and sidewalks of the shopping centers; (4) the potential for the
reasonable regulation of solicitation activities. Id. at 841, 478 P.2d at 800.
87. 407 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
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Justice Powell, for the majority, pointed out that in Marsh the property
owner had in effect become the State. Since the company town had taken
on all the attributes of a municipality and the owner had invited all of the
general public, he could not assert the claim of private ownership to deny in-
dividuals the right to engage in first amendment activity. Turning to Logan
Valley and to Tanner, Powell noted that the invitation in these cases was only
to those members of the public who intended to do business with the tenants.
Contending that all retail stores and service establishments are open to the
public in the sense that customers and potential customers are encouraged to
enter, the Court refused to accept the respondents' argument that no restric-
tions on handbilling were permissible. Instead it pointed out that the deci-
sion in Logan Valley had indeed placed severe limitations on unrelated first
amendment activities. Stressing that the picketing had been allowed only
because it was directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping
center property was being put and only because there were no reasonable al-
ternative means to convey the message to the intended audience elsewhere,
the Court found that the respondents here had failed to show the required
relationships.8s  Therefore, in balancing the first amendment rights of the re-
spondents with the fifth and fourteenth amendment rights of the private
property owners the Court found that "... on the facts presented in this
case the answer was clear."90
The majority's determination that consideration be given to the availability
of alternative forums in instances where there is a conflict in competing in-
terests seems valid. In Marsh, where all of the traditional areas used for the
expression of first amendment activities were privately owned, it was neces-
sary to treat parts of the private property as public in order to protect those
89. By limiting the significance of Logan Valley to these points, the majority was
able to dismiss Tanner's arguments concerning the Center's quasi public nature sum-
marily. Justice Marshall gave a scathing criticism of the simplistic conclusion when
he said:
It is evident from the Court's opinion that the majority fails to grasp the es-
sence of our decision in Logan Valley. The Court notes that there is a
difference between a free standing store and extremely large ones, but
suggests that because the difference is "of degree-not of principle" it is un-
important. This flies directly .in the face of Logan Valley where we said
that as private property expands to the point where it becomes, in reality,
the business district of a community, the rights of the owners to proscribe
speech on the part of those invited to use the property diminish. When the
Court states that this was broad language that was somehow unnecessary to
our decision, it betrays its misunderstanding of the holding. 407 U.S. at
581 n.5.
90. 407 U.S. at 570. The majority agreed that speech occupies a preferred position
when equally weighed against a conflicting interest yet found it easy to reach their
conclusion. They found that the property interest outweighed the right of an indi-
vidual to use the property when such a denial would not destroy his ability to effec-
tively communicate his message elsewhere.
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rights. If access to the business district in Marsh had been denied there
would have been no effective means of conveying outside opinions to the in-
habitants. Similarly, in Logan Valley the only area in which picketing
could be effective was within the shopping center since, as a practical matter,
the audience to whom the communication was directed was near the Weis
Market. Although the argument could be made that handbilling or soliciting
would be less effective outside of the shopping center, the Court's opinion
that "[r]espondents could have distributed these handbills on any public
street, on any public sidewalk, in any public park, or in any public building
in the city of Portland"' is well taken.
It should be recognized that when an owner opens a shopping center to the
public for his own financial gain he anticipates circumscribing his own
property rights in certain instances as a cost of doing business. Thus, he
should expect that if labor difficulties arise between one of his tenants and its
employees there will be some infringement on his property rights as the em-
ployees attempt to direct their activities towards the source of the dispute.
However, since the property owner is not benefited and, indeed, may be
harmed by the indiscriminate use of his property by those individuals not in-
tending to shop, there seems to be no valid justification for forcing him to
provide a facility to be used as a public forum on every popular issue. The
burden of showing both the necessity of using the private property in order to
communicate effectively and the lack of available alternative forums should
be placed on the individual seeking the use of the private property.
In dismissing the claim that consideration must be given to whether the
shopping center is the functional equivalent of the Marsh business district,
the Court has seemingly discarded the physical characteristics test entirely in
favor of the balancing test. This may prove to be a more workable standard
since many of the problems in ascertaining whether a facility or area has be-
come quasi-public will be eliminated. Nonetheless, the new test should still
involve the consideration of many of the same factors on a case by case basis.
The Court's opinion limited the accessibility of all quasi-public property to
individuals seeking to express messages critical of the businesses conducted
thereon. In so doing, it severely restricted the ability of individuals to dis-
91. Id. at 564. The same conclusion was reached by one author who also felt that
Logan Valley should not be applied broadly:
The Marsh rationale . . . should not be applied indiscriminately to the shop-
ping center problem. There are significant differences between a company
town and a shopping center. The ability to communicate with the occupants
of a company town without trespassing is severely limited because its people
not only shop there, but live and work there as well. Communication with
the patrons of a shopping center may conceivably be made at other places
and other times. 5 HOUSTON L. REv..193, 196 (1968),.
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seminate different views to a sizeable proportion of the population quickly
and effectively. Admitting that one does not spend an entire lifetime in a
shopping center and that a multitude of viewpoints will be encountered
daily, the realities of suburban living belie the continued existence of the
traditional town square. Lloyd Corporation, for example, owned not only
the Lloyd Center but other adjacent land on which there were three hotels,
four office buildings, a high rise Presbyterian home, a 4.77 acre school and
other businesses within a 130 block area. 92 It should be evident that as the
property owner begins to expand beyond the shopping mall into both resi-
dential and business areas it may become necessary to reexamine the physi-
cal characteristics of the facilities to see if they have acquired the attributes
of the Marsh company town. Since this situation is not likely to occur very
often, the bulk of litigation will probably arise in an attempt to determine the
scope of the term "consonant with the use to which the property is being
put." In this regard, the Court's new interpretation of Logan Valley indi-
cates an insistence that the activity be related to the retail function of the
shopping center.
Perhaps the most logical justification for the changed interpretation of
Logan Valley lies in the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall who said
"[t]he vote in Logan Valley was 6-3, and that decision is only four years old.
But, I am aware that the composition of this Court has radically changed in
four years." a93 Indeed, four of the five Justices remaining from that court
dissented in this opinion and it must be noted that the change in personnel
had much to do with the new interpretation. Nevertheless, the Court made
valid distinctions between the ability to communicate in a company town, in
a shopping center and in other areas of the community. Through this inter-
92. Supra note 13, at 25. Justice Marshall was especially concerned about the fact
that members of the Portland community could probably buy all of the things that
they might need from the Lloyd Center and that if different viewpoints were to reach
these individuals, it would have to occur within Lloyd Center. He noted that to for-
bid access to the forum where the greatest number of people could be reached would
deny those individuals unable to afford access to television, radio, newspapers and
other mass media the means to reach the masses. Marshall apparently expects the
private property owner to subsidize the citizen seeking expression of first amendment
rights. This subsidy would arise because of the citizens' inability to reach a large
proportion of the population with an equivalent expenditure of time and money.
93. 407 U.S. at 584. One author had realistically assessed the possible future ex-
pansion in this area of the law as dependent upon the philosophical composition of
the Court-
Conclusions as to the repercussions of Logan Valley are logically available, but
policy does not necessarily follow logic. Nevetheless, from the fact that
of the Logan Valley majority of six (Mr. Justice Douglas concurring sepa-
rately) only Mr. Chief Justice Warren is retiring at the end of the 1968 term,
one may superficially assume that a majority of at least five will continue
to support the holding on its facts, even if not agreeing with every implication
of Mr. Justice Marshall's language. Forkosh, supra note 63, at 266.
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pretation, the Court has indicated that only in exceptional cases will it over-
ride the rights of the property owner who has designed and maintained his
facility for a business purpose. To succeed, the claimant must prove either
that the relationship between the purposes of the speech and the use of the
facilities is direct or that the private property has taken on all of the attrib-
utes of a town. In making this determination the Court will weigh the equi-
ties of the parties. With the current composition of the Court, the individual
seeking access to quasi-public property will find the task of convincing five
Justices quite difficult. It is apparent that the Tanner Court has finally real-
ized that quasi-public property is also quasi-private.9 4
Ralph N. Boccarosse
The Comprehensive Health Manpower Training
Act of 1971: Panacea or Placebo?
In 1963, the 88th Congress enacted the Health Professions Educational
Assistance Act,' which established the first federal program directed to meet
the critical needs for physicians, dentists, and certain other health profes-
sional manpower, providing assistance to schools for construction of facili-
ties and assistance to students in the form of loans. The HPEA programs
have undergone repeated amendment since the original enactment. The
most recent of these is embodied in the Comprehensive Health Manpower
Training Act of 197 1.2 It is the underlying need for such programs, their
94. In an opinion dated about three weeks after Tanner the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision, reached the same conclusion as the Tanner court re-
garding solicitation of signatures for a nominating petition inside a private mall. Re-
fusing to expand Marsh and Logan Valley beyond their facts and concluding that the
California Supreme Court's holding in Diamond v. Bland was an unwarranted extension
of those principles, the court noted that under these circumstances there was no justifi-
cation for giving the first amendment a preferred position over the fifth. Stating in a
footnote that their decision had been reached prior to the decision of the Supreme
Court, they nevertheless followed the same strict interpretation of footnote nine of
Logan Valley. Homart Development Co. v. Fein, 293 A.2d 493 (D. R.I. 1972).
1. Act of Sept. 24, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-129, 77 Stat. 164 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 292-293 (Supp. 1963) ).
2. Act of Nov. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-157, 85 Stat. 431 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 293-295h (Supp. 1973)).
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